University of South Florida

Digital Commons @ University of South Florida
Natural Hazards Center Collection

Community and Campus Partnerships

January 1994

Social response to the 1994 Northridge California earthquake
Paul W. O'Brien
University of Colorado, Boulder -- Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information
Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/nhcc

Recommended Citation
O'Brien, Paul W. and University of Colorado, Boulder -- Natural Hazards Research and Applications
Information Center, "Social response to the 1994 Northridge California earthquake" (1994). Natural
Hazards Center Collection. 47.
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/nhcc/47

This Text is brought to you for free and open access by the Community and Campus Partnerships at Digital
Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Hazards Center Collection by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more information, please
contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

HAZARD HOUSE COE

~

--.-_,.. ,.,."."".,..~-~-~~~

C~~
VJ

•

~~~'" ~~
V

Social Response to the 1994 Northridge
California Earthquake

By
Paul W. O'Brien

QUICK RESPONSE RESEARCH REPORT #69

1994

This publication is part of the Nat~ral Hazards
.
Research & Applications Information Center's ongoing
Quick Response Research Report Series.
http://www.colorado.edufhazards

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not
necessarily those of the Natural Hazards Center or the University
of Colorado.

Social Response to the 1994 Northridge California Earthquake

Final Report

Submitted by:
Paul W. O'Brien, Ph.D.
California state University-Stanislaus
Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice
801 West Monte vista Ave
Turlock, CA 95382

Submitted to:
The Natural Hazards Research and
Applications Information Center
Boulder, CO

Fall 1994

1

Introduction
The following is the final report on the 1994 Northridge
earthquake that struck southern California on January 17, 1994.
Immediately following the occurrence of the quake, this
researcher was sent to the stricken area. That allowed for the
collection of perishable data on occurrences surrounding the
immediate aftermath of the event. This research was supported by
the National Science Foundation by funds administered by the
Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center,
housed at the University of Colorado in Boulder, Colorado.
The quake measured 6.8 on the Richter scale. It came as a
surprise to many, based on the epicenter. Seismologists have now
determined that the rupture occurred nine miles underground on an
unknown thrust fault (Newsweek, 1994. p. 34). The location of the
epicenter has been determined to have been in the Northridge area
of the Los Angeles basin. Northridge is a town in the San
Fernando Valley, which lies several miles north of the City and
County of Los Angles. The epicenter has given this earthquake its
name, namely The Northridge Earthquake.
The location of the epicenter makes this earthquake unique
with important lessons to be learned. The importance stems from
the fact that the affected area is inhabited by approximately
nine million people. Thus the potential for high numbers of
injuries and fatalities was great. An earthquake this magnituqe
is the first with an epicenter in such a densely populated area
of the United States. The 1989 Lorna Prieta earthquake, in
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contrast, did affect the nine million people in the San Francisco
Bay Area, but the epicenter of that event was located in a very
rural mountainous area called Loma Prieta in the area around
Santa Cruz, California.
Given the potential for high destruction, be it property, or
life, the Northridge earthquake deserves attention. sections-will
include: lifelines/infrastructure, immediate public response,
level of citizen preparedness, the recovery, and conclusions.
This final report presents findings from three days of
fieldwork. Days include the day of the earthquake, and two
sUbsequent days in the stricken area. The immediacy of access to
the field allowed this researcher to interview respondents as the
events unfolded including experiencing the many after shocks that
occurred.
The Event
The earthquake struck on January 17, 1994 at 4:31 a.m. in
the morning. This was the positive news about the earthquake.
Positive in that the early morning hour was one of the few times
that a city the size of Los Angeles rests. The City and County of
Los Angeles is currently home to over three million people. The
surrounding suburbs contributes another four million, bringing
the metropolitan population to well over nine million people. In
terms of area, the Los Angeles basin comprises over 452 square
miles.
Another event "conspired" on the day of the earthquake to
help residents of the city of Angles. January 17th, the day of
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the quake, was an official holiday. The vast majority of
metropolitan area residents had Monday free to celebrate Martin
Luther King Day. This holiday translated into freeways that were
much emptier than on a usual computing day. Many area residents
were out of the area enjoying the three day holiday. This helped
in the initial response by emergency crews. Traffic jams resulted
Monday evening as concerned families attempted to reunite with
their relatives from outside the city.
One final aspect helped the area deal with immediate
problems it faced in the days following the earthquake. That
final factor was the weather. Normal weather patterns in Los
Angeles during the month of January are characterized by rain.
January was drier than others in the past. Skies were blue and
temperatures were in the 70s. The weather had a profound impact
on how residents dealt with the numerous after shocks that
occurred.
Large numbers of city residents slept outside. Sleeping
outside is not a new phenomena following an earthquake. Similar
stories have been told immediately following the Lorna Prieta
earthquake (Bolin and Stanford, 1990. p. 101). Those sleeping
outside following the Northridge earthquake numbered in the
thousands. One could not drive down any street in the Northridge
section of town, and not find tents staked out on lawns, in
parks, and anywhere else residents could find room. It is as if
mother nature conspired with residents to make their initial
misery more bearable.
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Methodology

Given the quick response of this researcher entering the
field, a qualitative methodology was employed. The researcher was
in the area the day of the earthquake. Respondents were selected
based on availability. Once a respondent wase located, a
structured interview was administered to that person. This type
of data collection allows for immediate data to be collected, but
does not allow this study to be generalized beyond the population
interviewed.
Given the size of the affected area three sub-locations were
chosen as representative of the region. Interviews were completed
in downtown Los Angles, Northridge, and in Pasadena. Downtown Los
Angles was selected for several reasons including: 1) much of the
emergency was directed from the City and County building in their
Emergency Operations Center (EOC), 2) Los Angles forms the core
of the area, and 3) much of the infrastructure e.g., 1-10 damaged
occurred within the city and County of Los Angeles.
Northridge was selected because: 1) it is where the
epicenter was located, 2) some of the highest rates of overall
damage occurred there, and 3) it had the highest level of
fatalities. Finally Pasadena was selected for inclusion because:
1) it was outside the major stricken area, 2) it suffered minimal
levels of damage and no fatalities, and 3) it was thus used as a
baseline for "normal" urban activity, following an earthquake.
Approximately 31 interviews were completed in the three days
following the event with some via the telephone. The phone
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interviews were done in order to have the input of official
spokes people from organizations too involved in the on-going
emergency to take time away from their emergency duties to
complete an interview. Many interviews included other family
members, neighbors, or passers-by, but such interviews were
counted as one for the primary person interviewed.
From 31 interviews, approximately 15 were with residents in
the three areas noted above. Nine interviews were with police,
fire, and military personnel on duty in various locations during
the on-going emergency. Two interviews were with personnel
working in the county EOCs, and three miscellaneous interviews
included people from state and federal agencies. Two were
interviews with non-profit organizations involved in the
emergency, most notably the Red Cross.

Lifelines/Infrastructure
Lifelines are an important area of concern in any natural
disaster. This holds especially true with an area as large and
densely populated as that stricken by the Northridge earthquake.
Data were collected and reported on the extent of the disruption
caused by the quake.
The Northridge earthquake was similar to other earthquakes
here in the US and abroad. After the initial main shock the fire
department was in constant fire suppression mode. The bulk of
these fires had begun due to gas pipes breaks from the
earthquake. Fire departments in the Los Angeles area worked round

6

the clock in the first days after the quake.
As noted in the methodology section some interviews were
completed weeks later due to emergency personnel's engagement in
the on-going emergency. The fire department is a typical example.
It was impossible to get access to fire department personnel in
levels of command in the days following the quake. Fire
department personnel were working 12 hour shifts.
As noted above the earthquake occurred at 4:31 a.m. the
morning of January 17, 1994. The Los Angeles Fire Department
(LAFD) went immediately into their Earthquake Emergency
Operational Mode. At 4:35 a.m. or four minutes following the
earthquake the Emergency Operations Center was activated. It was
officially closed on February 10, 24 days after the earthquake.
By 7:00 a.m., that morning the LAFD had responded to over 100
incidents. By 9:45 a.m., all fires in the valley were under
control, with no active major structure fires in progress (LAFD,
1994. p. 3). Within the first 24 hours following the earthquake
the LAFD had responded to over 2,200 incidents, approximately 2
1/2 times the daily average (LAFD, 1994. p. 3).
The 12 hour shift on and 12 hours off was also mandated for
the Los Angeles Police Department. The city seemed full of police
immediately following the earthquake. There were many concerns
about pUblic order following the earthquake. This concern for
public safety is typical after most natural disasters, though
research clearly shows that most fears are largely unfounded
(Hodler, 1982. p.48). The LAFD did report sporadic looting, but
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it did not appear to be widespread (LAFD, 1994. p. 2).
The concern for pUblic safety can only be understood within
the local ideographic context of Los Angeles. The city of Los
Angeles has experienced high tensions, based on poor race
relations in the city. These poor race relations came to boil in
the summer of 1991 when South Central Los Angeles erupted in
riots. Representatives of Los Angeles, through various media
sources, stated categorically, that "South Central" would not
happen again in the wake of the earthquake. Thus police presence
was everywhere. For example, on a typical day in the City and
county of Los Angeles, between 500 and 600 arrests are made by
the police department. In the 24 hour time period following the
quake, 73 arrests were made (as noted on KFWB Radio AM980). One
could argue that the quake itself had an effect, which it must
have, but suffice it to say that police presence was everywhere
in the city making a criminal's life extremely difficult as a
result of the riot history and then earthquake.
water supply was also interrupted. Immediately following the
earthquake, it was reported that three of the city's four
aqueducts had been damaged and could not carry any water. Initial
estimates reported a total of 3000-4000 breaks throughout the
system. There was widespread concern that water might run out in
the city. Various city governments got together to devote
whatever resources were necessary to get water running again. The
Water Department in the City and County of Los Angeles worked
round-the-clock to restore water to the city.
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The Los Angeles school system was also heavily damaged
following the main shock and subsequent after shocks. Immediately
following the event, it was reported that over 300 pUblic schools
in the basin were damaged and could not be used, until major
improvements had been made. This left a pUblic with the added
burden of not knowing where and when their children might resume
attending school. The closing of schools brings many problems.
The first and most obvious is that children are not attending and
learning.
In addition, school to many children is not only a learning
place, but serves important social functions as well. Many
children like a routine, and school belongs to that normal
routine. The mass closing of schools threw many children out of
their routine. This meant that children needed to stay home with
other family members for long periods of time. They were not
around their usual playmates, and several children interviewed
via their parents, expressed great concern over the safety of
their class mates; that is, had they survived? This uncertainly
about play mates and a normal routine increased the stress and
tension already present in many parents.
The real lifelines story in the Northridge earthquake
concerned the freeways. Los Angeles is a typical example of
American dependence on the automobile. It is a city that is
criss-crossed by freeways. It is a city where mass transit takes
a back seat to the private automobile. A total of 11 major breaks
in the freeway system occurred as a result of the earthquake.
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The most damaging break occurred with 1-5 bridges collapsing
north of the city. The break, in effect, cut off the region to
traffic moving either north or south, in or out of the city. The
second major break occurred with the collapse of the Santa Monica
freeway also named 1-10. 1-10 is the busiest freeway traveled in
America. It carries the bulk of city traffic across town. The
closing of the Santa Monica freeway meant that over nine million
people needed to take small, crowded secondary streets to cross
the city.
The importance of the freeway collapses and closures goes
far beyond the apparent frustration of needing more time to get
where one is going. There was widespread uneasiness of residents
having their freedom of movement taken away by the earthquake.
Considerable time was given every night on the news to update
people on what was closed and what was open. The time given to
the problem far outstripped the actual reality with local
cultural dynamics coming into play.
Public Response
Public response forms the core of this quick response
report. What did the pUblic do in the immediate aftermath of the
earthquake? How did people respond to the main shock and after
shocks? What were the information flows immediately following the
event?

Finally, what were the levels of preparedness and

earthquake awareness of citizens?
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Immediate Public Response
Thirty years of disaster research gives one a fairly clear
vision of what transpires following a major natural disaster such
as the Northridge earthquake. As expected, there was the period
immediately following the event when victims, and others come
together to aid one another. Barton has called this the
altruistic community (Barton, 1969. p. 206). This time period is
characterized by heroic events and unselfish sacrifice.
Northridge was no exception.
There was a clear convergence of people to the stricken area
immediately following the event. Those represented included:
fire, police, and other emergency personnel. In addition, many of
the stricken residents went to neighboring parts of their areas
to assist others who, for whatever reason, had experienced more
damage than themselves. There was clearly a sense of "altruistic
community" in the hours and days following the earthquake.
Overall the best description of residents in the entire area
surveyed could be described as fear. Many interviews were
completed by long term native Californians. The most often
repeated statement was the force with which the earthquake
struck. Seismologists are now looking into the event in more
detail. Most residents described a violent rolling motion that
they claim was different from their past experiences.
After the initial main shock many spoke of leaving the Los
Angeles basin and never returning. It is believed that the
reasons for these remarks were two-fold. First this was a large
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earthquake, and did considerable damage. Current damage estimates
are over 30 billion dollars. These will likely go higher. The
damage was evident in all areas of the basin. Public structures,
infrastructure, and private residences were all affected. Damage
was particularly extensive in the Northridge area, which has
received extensive media coverage. There were many other
unpublished damage pockets. Many of these locations were further
north in the mountains surrounding the basin. Names like Granada
Hills, Saugus, Piru, and Santa Clarita are just a few of the
"unknown" locations that received considerable damage and little
attention. They did, however, add to the collective psychological
scarring of the region.
The second major reason for the widespread fear on the part
of many in southern California can be attributed to disaster
overload. Southern California has experienced a number of well
publicized natural, and human-caused disasters. Some of these
could include: the Rodney King riots in 1991, the fire storms
that burned down hundreds of homes in the canyons above the city
in 1992, mud slides following the fire storms, and finally the
Northridge earthquake. combined, these events have had a
cumulative result of making the

pUblic overloaded and tired, in

every sense of the word. Thus in the many interviews completed
with the public there was a resilience seen in Americans
following any disaster, but also a great apprehension of what
will come next.
Another exceptional aspect about the Northridge

earthqua~e
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was that it struck a late 20th century diverse multiracial/multi-cultural region. Los Angeles is composed of a wide
variety of people of different color and ethnic backgrounds. This
phenomenon came into play in Los Angeles, and is perhaps one of
the valuable lessons to be learned for the future. Northridge was
one of the hardest hit areas in the region. California, however,
does have building codes that are designed to prevent or to
mitigate losses in such an event. Northridge has hundreds of
apartment buildings. It was one of these typical three story
buildings that collapsed and caused 16 deaths at the Northridge
Meadows apartment complex (Newsweek, 1994. p. 31).
Many of the apartment buildings in the area failed. The area
was inundated with U-Haul trucks immediately following the
earthquake by residents attempting to move their possessions out,
before it was "Red Tagged", i.e., deemed unsafe by the Building
Department. Many inhabitants in these apartment complexes could
be characterized as coming from lower Socioeconomic backgrounds.
Many corne from different racial/ethnic backgrounds, primarily
Hispanic.
Many in the Hispanic communities first reaction was to leave
their buildings, and to remain outside. As night approached, they
resolved in large numbers, not to reenter the buildings.
Thousands remained outside for days and even weeks following the
earthquake. This proved to be a logistical nightmare to many
emergency workers and aid organizations. They needed to go to
parks, playgrounds, and other public places to locate victims of
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the earthquake.
In addition to the locating problem, there was also a
language barrier. Many in this community are first generation
immigrants. Los Angeles also has a sizable illegal population.
Estimates range as high as one million illegal immigrants in
California. Common to both groups is the lack of English at a
level of understanding for warnings to the public. Completing
government paperwork for reimbursement of losses is even more
problematic. One of the major lessons learned from the Northridge
earthquake is that this is a diverse region.
Much has been written on the aspect of rumors following a
disaster event (Scanlon, 1977. p. 125). These rumors can deal
with more events i.e., after shocks or with perhaps number of
fatalities, or rumors of help or lack thereof. This notion of
rumors occurred after the Northridge earthquake, but in many
languages and cultures. The warning process became a three
dimensional problem with cUlture, language, and race. This
compounded the problem of those in government. It was their task
to put out good reliable information to the pUblic, to quench
rumors. That task became a multi-faceted effort, given the
diverse populations for whom the message was targeted. Further
research needs to be done in the area to reflect the current
realities of many American cities.
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Level of citizens Preparedness
The Northridge earthquake surprisingly carne as a surprise to
many. Surprising because California is "earthquake country". Past
research has consistently shown that there is a phenomena called
earthquake "culture" in parts of California (Mileti and Hutton,
1987, Fitzpatrick and O'Brien, 1992). Residents of southern·
California routinely joke and make fun of the "Big One". (The big
one being an anticipated 8.0 Richter or greater magnitude
earthquake).
When smaller earthquakes happen in southern California there
is immediate widespread speculation that this will be the prelude
to the "Big One". Given this earthquake culture coupled with
constant reminders, i.e., small earthquakes always happening in
the area, one would logically conclude that a population
sUbjected to such earthquake dynamics would have learned their
lessons and would show high levels of preparedness.
From the majority of interviews completed in this ministudy, from all print media investigated and all of the mass
media digested in the time period possible, just the opposite is
true. Those residents interviewed and probably many others in the
Los Angeles basin were wholly unprepared for this 6.8 R
earthquake, let alone the "Big One".
Emergency managers and others whose responsibility it is to
protect the pUblic, have been warning this population for years,
if not decades, to be prepared. There are free films available,
pUblic speakers from several city and county agencies on the
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topic and the month of April is devoted in California to
earthquake awareness. Californians do not lack resources or
available material on the topic.
The first crisis occurred over water. As noted in the
lifelines section, three of Los Angeles' four aqueducts were
damaged. Thus water service was cut off to large parts of the
city. This was initially a minor problem on day one, but as the
time grew, so did the impatience of the public. Many demands came
from the public that the National Guard bring in water
immediately. Why----few residents had followed the basic advice
to have a three day water supply on hand in such an emergency. Of
all interviews completed, only two reported having stored any
drinking water. The most often given answer as to why not was the
belief that either the city's water supply would not be affected
in an earthquake or that the respondent didn't feel it necessary
since an occurrence was highly unlikely. Clearly residents in the
Los Angeles basin are risk adverse. They live in an earthquake
culture, but cling on to the belief that it will not affect them.
Food also quickly became a problem. Most food stores in the
Northridge area were closed. In addition,-and apparently
crippling, most fast food restaurants were also damaged and/or
closed. Residents in the area must have had few provisions for
this eventually. One pUblic service that radio provided was to
announce restaurants that were open. This enabled those without
food to get a meal. Naturally the Red Cross was quick in
responding with emergency food kitchens, which were well attended
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once in operation.
Earthquake insurance is another factor that comes to mind in
looking at preparedness and belief in future earthquake events.
It was widely reported in both print and mass media that fewer
than twenty-five percent of homeowners had any type of earthquake
insurance. It does, however, beg the question why do so few
residents in a known seismic active area carry any protection for
their personal property? Again one can conclude that this is a
risk adverse population. A population that routinely jokes about
the "Big One", but does little or anything to protect itself from
possible damage, be it financial or otherwise.

Conclusions
This final section will draw conclusions, based on the
description above. The Northridge earthquake was an expensive
event by any standard. Sixty-one persons lost their lives as a
result of the earthquake. The majority, 57, occurred in the City
and County of Los Angeles. In addition, current damage figures
are being set at around 30 billion dollars. This number is sure
to rise until the region is whole again.
There are many lessons to be learned from the event. Some of
these are new lessons, many have been repeated after each such
event, with lessons not being learned and internalized. The first
lesson is that earthquakes happen, and the pUblic can prepare
itself for such events. Public outreach is necessary at all
levels of the population, government, and the private sector. The
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theory of risk communication is being used by an ever widening
group of officials, whose task it is to protect the pUblic.
Following an event like the Northridge earthquake, it bears
repeating again. The pUblic needs a steady flow of information to
encourage them into action.
American cities are becoming more racially and ethnically
diverse as we proceed into the 21st century. This fact must be
recognized by emergency managers. Organizations need to have
personnel available who can communicate with major groups in
society. Barring this happening, these groups in society will
take on an increasingly disproportionate amount of the risk. This
will occur since their decisions will be based on inaccurate or
lack of information. This demographic fact must also be
recognized by the lead agency in disasters, namely the federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
FEMA is in the position of having regional offices. These
local offices must be tasked with knowing the population
breakdowns of their regions and ultimately being able to deal
with those populations, when the need arises. The cry was loud
and long following the Northridge earthquake that FEMA personnel
taking applications needed to be bi-lingual. FEMA should address
an official policy on this topic, before they are forced to in
future events.
The mass media played a pivotal role following the
Northridge earthquake. They did repeat after shock warnings with
great regularity. They devoted countless hours to the event.
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Government leaders, and emergency managers need to keep the lines
of communication open to news organizations. When the need
arises, they will be in a position of knowing the news personnel.
That relationship can be used to inform the pUblic on the latest
news they need for taking protective actions.
Insurance is another area that needs reappraisal. Much of
the loss from the earthquake is, by default, the responsibility
of the federal government. One main reason for this is that the
vast majority of homeowners have elected not to carry earthquake
insurance. Homeowners have, in effect, shifted their risk to the
federal government. Perhaps this too should be reevaluated. One
possible solution is to designate regions where earthquake
insurance is mandatory. Thus the private sector could also take
part in the reconstruction phase.
The purchase of insurance might also be considered by the
pUblic sector. Historically government has been self-insured.
Very often this was done to save short-term costs to the tax
payers. Northridge might be an event to rethink this policy. Los
Angeles now is in the position of rebuilding 300 pUblic schools,
and many other public buildings. What will the total cost be? The
same question remains also for the state government. The
California state University Northridge campus experienced over
350 million dollars in damage. Almost the entire campus must now
be rebuilt. Might it have been better to spread that risk also to
the private sector? Schools are only one part of many buildings
and other facilities lost by the many governments that comprise
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the Los Angeles basin. Now the region will be paying higher
taxes, possibly passing new earthquake related bond issues, and
other measures of tax collection to rebuild. Could part of that
burden have been shifted by having had some form of private
earthquake insurance? These and other questions remain.
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